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Abstract 
The ASEAN Way of security cooperation – based on principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, 
peaceful resolution of conflict, and consultation and consensus decision-making – has maintained 
intra-ASEAN harmony since the grouping’s formation in 1967. It has also enabled ASEAN to play a 
central role in regional integration by successfully engaging external major powers in an overlapping 
regional network of ASEAN-led organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia 
Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. However, exercising decisive influence within 
the wider Asia-Pacific environment is beyond ASEAN’s limited strategic resources. Moreover, the 
consensus-seeking, shallowly institutionalized ASEAN Way approach has seemed poorly equipped to 
handle Chinese assertive divide-and-rule diplomacy that has accompanied its power projection in the 
South China Sea. As China mounts its maritime claims and seeks to expand its regional influence 
relative to the United States, ASEAN is challenged to maintain intra-ASEAN unity, deepen intra-
ASEAN integration and effectively engage the United States, China and other powers in safeguarding 
peace and stability in the region. Despite shortcomings in the ASEAN Way of security cooperation, it 
is argued that, given the inability of China and Japan to provide cooperative leadership in establishing 
an alternative multilateral security mechanism, ASEAN will continue to serve as the “default 
instrumentality” for maintaining a modest level of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific. 
Keywords 
ASEAN Way, security cooperation, default instrumentality, US pivot to Asia, South China Sea, 
disputed maritime claims, UNCLOS, Code of Conduct 
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This paper examines security dynamics in Southeast and East Asia involving the ten member countries 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN’s role in managing security 
cooperation, both among its members and with external major powers, particularly the United States 
and China. It is argued that the ASEAN framework for security cooperation is drawn from the 
“ASEAN Way” norms articulated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which notably 
emphasize peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for territorial sovereignty. The focus here is 
how ASEAN deals with maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea, an issue area that has 
attracted growing international attention and concern, particularly since 2009, when China began more 
forcefully to assert its claims to almost all of the South China Sea, thus threatening the direct interests 
of four ASEAN claimant states (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam) as well as the geo-
strategic, economic and political interests of the United States and the international community at 
large.  
The paper begins with an analysis of how the ASEAN Way has determined the principles, 
processes and mechanisms of intra-ASEAN regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia. It then 
moves on to an examination of how ASEAN engages external major powers in fostering security 
cooperation and managing security challenges in the wider Asia-Pacific region and concludes with an 
evaluation of the efficacy of the ASEAN Way in dealing with maritime security in the light of recent 
developments in the South China Sea. The paper argues that the adherence of ASEAN member 
countries to the norms articulated in the ASEAN Way has to date sustained intra-ASEAN security 
cooperation and maintained regional stability in Southeast Asia. However, security cooperation 
involving external powers in the South China Sea and the wider Asia-Pacific region has proved more 
complex and problematic. As a grouping of small powers (and an emerging middle power, Indonesia) 
with limited military capabilities, ASEAN has had to utilize a combination of realist and neoliberal 
approaches (relying on the America’s security guarantees to obtain a regional balance of power in the 
former case, and promoting economic interdependence and institutional engagement between ASEAN 
and its major dialogue partners, in particular, China) to manage tensions in the region. ASEAN has 
also employed a constructivist approach to “socialize” its dialogue partners into the ASEAN Way of 
peaceful consultative and consensus-building means of managing conflict in the South China Sea. 
Finally, the paper argues that so long as China and Japan fail to provide cooperative leadership in 
establishing an alternative multilateral mechanism for security cooperation, ASEAN will continue to 
serve as the “default instrumentality” for maintaining a modest level of multilateral security 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.  
Building a Regional Security Regime the ASEAN Way 
When examining ASEAN’s role in promoting regional cooperation and integration, scholars have 
utilized realist, neo-liberal or constructivist perspectives, or an eclectic combination of all three (see, 
e.g., Acharya 2009a, Ba 2009, Busse 1999, Emmers 2012, Goh 2008, Jones & Smith 2006, Nischalke 
2000, Ravenhill 2013, Sheldon 2014). While some scholars remain highly skeptical that the ASEAN 
Way, as currently constituted, could ever underpin a robust regional security regime (Jones & Smith 
2006, Nischalke 2000), others have evaluated the grouping’s contributions more positively (Acharya 
2013, Ba 2012, Busse 1999, Goh, 2012, Capie 2012, Kraft 2012). In contrast to Jones and Smith’s 
critique of ASEAN as a “fading institution” with “a peripheral rather than core role in regional growth 
and stability” (2006: 159, 277), Evelyn Goh argues that ASEAN “is universally acceptable as the 
‘driver’ of regionalism”, which has critically claimed a “voice” for smaller states in discussing and 
managing regional security affairs in a situation where great powers are suspicious of each other (Goh 
2012: 105, 112). Other scholars such as David Capie, while recognizing the weaknesses underlying 
the process and institutionalization of the ASEAN Way of regional cooperation, nevertheless 
concludes that ASEAN “has proved far more resilient than many could have predicted just a few years 
ago” (Capie 2012: 179). Amitav Acharya, while agreeing that ASEAN has successfully functioned as 
the fulcrum of geopolitical stability in Asia, cautions that ASEAN leaders need to retain unity, 
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strengthen mechanisms for cooperation, and maintain a “neutral broker image among great powers” in 
order to continue to play that role (2013: 21).  
Guided by the principles and norms of the ASEAN Way from its inception in 1967, ASEAN has 
expanded from a five-member (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) to a present 
day ten-member grouping (with the inclusion of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) 
with 626 million people and possessing a combined GDP of $2.4 trillion in 2014, making it the third 
largest economy in Asia and the seventh largest in the world (East-West Center, “ASEAN Matters for 
America”). In the founding ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration) the five 
original members explicitly disavowed the goal of security cooperation, seeking instead to focus on 
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and educational cooperation (ASEAN, “The ASEAN 
Declaration”). Thus, even as the five non-communist founding members came together in establishing 
ASEAN as a mechanism for war prevention and conflict management – specifically to deal with the 
security threat posed by Vietnam, which had earlier drawn America into a protracted war in Indochina 
– the founding leaders did not establish a collective security institution along the lines of the US-
sponsored North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949-present) or the short-lived Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954-1977) (Acharya 2009a: 54-62). Instead of striving to emulate the 
European model of integration, the Southeast Asian leaders drew upon regional norms based on “the 
route of informality, of eschewing legal formulations and legally binding commitments, of avoiding 
elaborate regional, supranational institutions” (Severino 2006: 4). The Declaration also included an 
important proviso making membership “open to participation to all States in the South-East Asian 
Region subscribing to the [declaration’s] aims, principles and purposes”, thus facilitating the 
grouping’s subsequent expansion and incorporation of Myanmar as well as former adversaries Laos, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. 
The distinctive “ASEAN Way” of community building and regional cooperation is based on four 
“codes of conduct”: (1) adherence to non-interference, non-use of force and peaceful resolution of 
conflict; (2) promotion of regional autonomy and collective self-reliance; (3) rejection of multilateral 
military pacts, but acceptance of bilateral defence cooperation pursued independently by individual 
member states (such as the Philippines-US and Thai-US security treaties); and (4) preference for 
social-cultural norms based on informal consultation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) rather 
than legal-rational norms in decision-making (Acharya 2009a: 54-98). These principles of sovereignty 
and non-interference, consensus decision-making and informality were subsequently reaffirmed in the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 and the ASEAN Charter of 2008.
1
 The TAC 
provided a set of behavioural norms for collective decision-making to regulate inter-governmental 
relations and manage intra-ASEAN disputes, as well as engage external powers in a low-key, informal 
and non-confrontational manner.  
Unlike the deeply institutionalized, rules-based European Union where member states are governed 
by a supranational authority with wide powers to regulate, coordinate and enforce compliance 
whenever deemed necessary, a model eschewed by ASEAN member states, the ASEAN Way provides 
for a shallowly-institutionalized, informal incrementalist approach to regional integration. The 
ASEAN norm of upholding national sovereignty and the right of “every State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion” (ASEAN, “Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation”) has necessarily confined the role of the ASEAN Secretariat to a coordinating body with 
no political mandate and authority to implement policies (Severino 2006: 20-22). Established in 
Jakarta in 1976 nine years after the body’s formation, the Secretariat not surprisingly remains 
                                                     
1
 As codified in the TAC, ASEAN’s foundational norms required member states to: (1) demonstrate mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations, (2) respect the right of every 
State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, (3) adhere to non-interference 
in the internal affairs of one another, (4) settle differences or disputes by peaceful means, (5) renounce the threat or use of 
force, and (6) practice effective cooperation among themselves (ASEAN, “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” 1976).  
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understaffed and underfunded, lacking the bureaucratic and legal capacity to exercise authority 
independently of the collective will of its member states. 
The ASEAN Way norms laid the foundations for a “security community” in Southeast Asia, in 
contrast to other prevailing frameworks of security cooperation, such as the “collective defence” 
community of North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the “collective security” community of the United 
Nations.
2
 Unlike NATO and the UN, ASEAN does not impose reciprocal obligations of military 
assistance, and does not require members to carry out collective punishment of aggression against 
other members or non-member states. ASEAN member states are guided by “strict and observed 
norms concerning non-use of force; no competitive arms race as well as commitment by all members 
to “institutions and processes (formal and informal) for the pacific settlement of disputes” and “long-
term prospects for war avoidance” (Acharya 2009a: 20, original parentheses). Scholars such as Donald 
Emmerson argue that while the ASEAN region has historically functioned as a “thin and pluralistic 
security community”, there is insufficient “empirical data on the existence…[of] a genuine cooperative 
identity among its elites” and no real assurance that ASEAN members will not fight one another in the 
years ahead (Emmerson 2005: 180,182, original italics). Michael Leifer, another prominent ASEAN 
scholar, has argued that ASEAN was established as an “aspirant security community”, one in which 
member states held a “shared belief in the positive relationship between economic development and 
security that served to reinforce the commitment to regional reconciliation as a way of avoiding any 
diversion of scarce resources” away from the immediate task of providing regional stability and 
promoting national and regional prosperity (Leifer 1999: 27). Emphasizing the fact that “ASEAN was 
certainly not conceived as a political community along the lines of the European model”, Leifer stated 
that security and peace in ASEAN have been addressed “through the development of a culture of intra-
mural dialogue and consultation based on close working relationships between ministers and officials 
and an adherence to common norms; not through invoking legal mechanisms for dispute settlement” 
(ibid: 28). In short, ASEAN can at best be described as a “nascent security” community, one that has 
maintained peace among its members though rivalry and competition still persist. The latter, according 
to Acharya, would be “muted by converging threat perceptions, expected trade benefits, an evolving 
common identity, and organizational emulation (learning from the experience of other multilateral 
organizations)” (2013: 6, original parentheses).  
ASEAN member states’ strong resistance to a dilution of their sovereignty stems largely from the 
region’s unhappy historical experience of western colonial rule, which ranged between some 300 years 
in Dutch Indonesia, 150 years in British Malaya and 100 years in French Indochina. In the decades 
after independence was finally achieved (with Brunei becoming independent only in 1984), ASEAN 
political elites have continued to place high priority on retaining full sovereignty over their respective 
countries. Arguing that ASEAN’s norms on regional cooperation can only be understood in the light 
of the region’s history and political culture, Nikolas Busse maintains that, unlike the European nations 
that were intent on creating a peaceful region in the aftermath of the devastation of the Second World 
War by “transcending the nation-state, in Southeast Asia it was about preserving it” (1999: 47). 
ASEAN’s resistance to the dilution of sovereignty, steadfast adherence to non-intervention and 
insistence on decision-making based on consultation and consensus have resulted in a cumbersome 
decision-making process and its moving at the pace of its least willing member and implementing 
decisions at the level of the lowest common denominator – i.e., policies that cause the least division 
among the member countries.
3
 ASEAN’s shallow institutionalization and lack of rules-based 
                                                     
2
 For a discussion of the differences in these models of security cooperation, see Acharya 2009a. 
3
 It should also be pointed out, however, that total agreement on an action is not always necessary. As described by former 
ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino, who held that position from 1992-2002, consensus decision-making does 
not require unanimity. In many cases ASEAN consensus on a proposal is arrived at when at least six members reach an 
agreement and the remaining members “do not feel strongly enough about the issue to block action on it”, because that 
proposal is not perceived to be “sufficiently injurious to their national interests for them to oppose it outright” (Severino 
2006: 34) 
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enforcement mechanisms are faulted for preventing it from implementing effective policies and 
undertaking activities deemed necessary to bridge the gap between its rhetorical aspirations and actual 
performance (see, e.g., Capie 2012). Critics such as David Jones and Mark Smith argue that in not 
dealing with underlying tensions but by simply ignoring them, ASEAN is patently irrelevant to the 
evolving security order in Southeast Asia” (2006: 71). Perceived shortcomings in other ASEAN-based 
organizations – namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) – are likewise attributed 
to the institutional, operational and normative limitations of the ASEAN Way. In all these bodies, only 
ASEAN states can chair or co-chair all the important meetings, shape the agenda and decide on the 
content of the chairman’s statements. Yet despite such criticisms of the ASEAN Way of regional 
cooperation, for reasons elaborated below, “non-ASEAN states, large and small, have acknowledged 
[ASEAN’s] central role, either explicitly or implicitly, by seeking admission and continuing to 
participate in these ASEAN-centered institutions” (Capie 2012: 168).  
Formed in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (currently comprising 27 members) was the first 
ASEAN-based body established to address security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Reflecting 
the influence of the ASEAN Way, the ARF’s decision-making process is consensus-driven, non-
binding and slow-paced. The ARF’s lack of progress in moving beyond its initial goal of undertaking 
confidence building measures to the next two goals of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution 
has particularly frustrated non-Asian members such as the US, Australia and Canada. By contrast, 
China and most other Northeast Asian states support the underlying normative principles of the 
ASEAN Way, particularly the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Capie 2012: 178). 
Noting the ARF’s underperformance in promoting security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, Ralf 
Emmers and Tan See Seng state: “The ARF has arguably achieved its initial objective of 
institutionalizing great powers relations within a multilateral cooperative structure and maintaining 
centrality of ASEAN within that architecture. Beyond that propitious beginning the ARF has lost 
momentum and is often dismissed as a “talk shop” incapable of addressing regional security 
affairs”(Emmers & Tan 2012: 95). The authors attribute ARF’s shortcomings to its “large membership 
and weak institutional structures, its strict adherence to the sovereignty and non-intervention principles 
as enshrined within the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that contradict any implementation of 
PD [preventive diplomacy] and contrasting strategic perspectives among its key participants” (ibid: 
96).  
During the post-Cold War decade of the 1990’s ASEAN expanded to include Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam. With the inclusion of these more authoritarian and economically less 
developed states (i.e., communist-governed Vietnam and Laos, military-governed Myanmar and a 
nominally democratic Cambodia, whose membership was postponed due to an internal political coup 
by strong man Hun Sen), the grouping predictably lost the relative institutional cohesiveness of the 
original ASEAN-5. While the ASEAN-5 were also authoritarian states when they first joined together 
in 1967, they have become more politically pluralistic (although Thailand has experienced democratic 
setbacks since 2006) and economically much more advanced. However, the onset of the 1997-1998 
Asian Financial Crisis and its impact on the domestic economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
caused internal stresses to ASEAN, which to many observers appeared to be adrift and rudderless for 
several years. After 2000 the grouping regained its footing under the renewed leadership of a 
revitalized, newly democratizing Indonesia, which in 1998 had freed itself of three decades of 
authoritarian rule under Suharto. Comprising some 40% of ASEAN’s population and constituting the 
largest country and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s democratic transition, its renewed 
commitment to regional and international cooperation and reinvigorated leadership in ASEAN 
revitalized the organization (Acharya 2009b). Under Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2003, ASEAN 
adopted the Bali Concord II (Declaration of ASEAN Concord II), a landmark development that sought 
to strengthen the institutional foundations of ASEAN through creating an integrated ASEAN 
Community by 2015 founded upon three “pillars”: the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) 
to pursue security cooperation and address new transnational security and non-traditional security 
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challenges through the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in 2006;
4
 the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) to establish a single market and production base; and the ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) to expand political and human rights through a new ASEAN 
Charter.  
The ASEAN Charter, which came into force in 2008, made ASEAN a legal entity with new powers 
to establish a human rights body and set up dispute settlement and compliance mechanisms. Despite 
the best efforts of Indonesia and the Philippines to strengthen democratic values, rule of law and 
human rights promotion, modify the consensus-based decision-making process and “[suspend] any of 
the rights and privileges of membership” for non-compliance or serious breaches of the Charter” (cited 
in Heng 2009: 18), the Charter as finally ratified continued to emphasize the principles of “respect for 
the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity” and “non-
interference in the internal affairs” of member states. It also required member states to respect the right 
of every state “to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion” 
and to rely on peaceful settlement of disputes as well as to renounce “aggression and the threat or use 
of force or any other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law” (ASEAN, “The 
ASEAN Charter”, Article 2). The key lesson that emerged from the ASEAN Charter ratification 
process is that ASEAN’s transformation into a rules-based institution backed by a robust secretariat 
with supranational authority to enforce decisions can be achieved only when all member countries are 
willing to hand over a meaningful degree of their sovereign power to the Secretariat. At present that 
seems a very distant prospect, at best.  
ASEAN’s shortcomings – manifested by its protracted and cumbersome decision-making 
mechanism and insistence on upholding of national sovereignty and non-intervention – have 
undoubtedly prevented the ASEAN Secretariat from having the institutional capacity and authority 
that is necessary to implement the reforms needed in realizing a fully operational ASEAN Community 
by 2015, the body’s self-declared date of achieving effective security, economic and socio-cultural 
cooperation. At the same time, the ASEAN Way has successfully maintained intra-ASEAN stability 
and prevented wars from breaking out between member states. While it has not prevented the 
occasional border clashes over disputed territories, such as the on-and-off fighting between Thailand 
and Cambodia over ownership of the Preah Vihear temple complex, and while cross-border tensions 
sometimes have erupted when domestic insurgencies (in Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar and 
Thailand) have spilled over borders, inter-governmental relations have remained stable and amicable, 
thus contributing to regional stability and facilitating inflows of foreign investments that continue to 
fuel the region’s robust economic growth.  
ASEAN “Centrality” and Regional Security Cooperation 
The theoretical literature on the security order in the region addresses the emergence of a “nascent 
security community” (Acharya 2009a, 2014)5 and “an interim regional order” (Goh 2008), where the 
hierarchy of power distribution in the region is topped by the US superpower overlay. China occupies 
the second tier as the regional great power, Japan and India constitute the third tier as major regional 
powers, and ASEAN, Australia and South Korea occupy the fourth tier (ibid: 149-152). While the 
interim order is still dominated by preponderant American power, the distribution of power is 
increasingly reshaped by China’s rise. Acharya’s theorizes that the nascent security community in the 
region might result in a “consociational security order”, one characterized by “a relationship of mutual 
                                                     
4
 A security reform proposed by Indonesia, aimed at giving military clout to the ASEAN Political and Security Community 
through setting up an ASEAN Peace Keeping Force, was, however, rejected by all the other nine members (Acharya 
2009b).  
5
 In contrast, a mature security community and robust security order are characterized by the absence of system-destroying 
conflict, such as major warfare, rather than the absence of competition and low-intensity conflict among nations per se. 
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accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves each other group’s 
relative autonomy and prevents the hegemony of any particular group” (2014: 159). Utilizing a 
primarily constructivist approach of “omni-enmeshing”, Goh argues that ASEAN has promoted a 
“complex balance of influence” in which “major power competition and balancing are channeled to 
take place within the constraints of [ASEAN] norms and institutions” (2012: 116). In the different 
iterations of the emerging regional security order, ASEAN’s “centrality”, i.e., its ability to promote 
security cooperation between ASEAN, the US and regional powers in the various ASEAN-led 
organizations (namely, ARF, APT, EAS and ADMM Plus) is widely recognized. At the same time, it 
is noted that ASEAN engagement with external powers relies on the predominantly normative aspect 
of “moral suasion”, since ASEAN lacks the material capacity to constrain any destabilizing behavior 
of major powers. Herman Kraft, among others, argues that the efficacy of ASEAN’s security 
engagement with external powers is dependent on the extent to which such actors have understood and 
internalized the ASEAN Way norms (Kraft 2012: 64).  
Fundamental to an understanding of the ASEAN mode of security engagement with external 
powers is its desire to attain regional autonomy, avoid entanglement in major power rivalries in the 
region, and maximize its margin of freedom to pursue its own economic and security goals, both 
nationally and regionally. As Kraft observes, the principle of non-interference “had as much to do with 
maintaining the security of the region by preventing it from getting entangled in great power rivalries 
as it did with preventing the latter from getting involved in the internal affairs of countries in the 
region” (Kraft 2012: 63). Alice Ba argues that in ASEAN’s constant struggle to maintain autonomy, it 
has employed a strategy of “diversifying dependence, rather than the more conventional and 
competitive sense of balancing against different threats…to mitigate dependence and expand choices 
and space for maneuver” (cited in Goh, 2008: 140). That desire to maintain regional autonomy does 
not preclude the right of member states to maintain close alliances with major powers, as evidenced in 
the bilateral treaty alliances of the Philippines and Thailand with the US. While Malaysia’s quest for 
an ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 (supported by Indonesia) drew 
only rhetorical commitment from other ASEAN states (Huxley1995), that concept found renewed 
support when it was revitalized in 1995 as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
(SEANWFZ). The latter initiative to obtain a guarantee for a nuclear weapon free zone in the ASEAN 
neighborhood from the five major nuclear powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United 
States) has gained traction, with China and the US having agreed to accede to SEANWFZ, also known 
as the Treaty of Bangkok (“Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty”).  
ASEAN’s ability to play a leading role in regional cooperation has been attributed to three causal 
factors. First, and most importantly, ASEAN, by default, is the beneficiary of the rivalry and divisions 
among the regional powers that have prevented any one of them from organizing and leading a 
multilateral security body in the region. Despite the shortcomings in the ASEAN Way of security 
cooperation, given the inability of China and Japan to provide cooperative leadership in establishing 
an alternative multilateral security institution, ASEAN will continue to serve as the “default 
instrumentality” for maintaining multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Second, the 
ASEAN model of minimalist regionalism provides instruments for informal cooperation rather than 
venues for institutionalizing and enforcing regional “rules of the game” a modus operandi that is 
acceptable to China, Japan and other regional powers. Third, the ASEAN Way norms fit comfortably 
with – and in fact were drawn from – pre-existing normative structures of Asian powers, as 
exemplified by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (mutual respect for each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in domestic affairs; 
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence), first articulated by China and India in 1953, 
and which subsequently served as the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement. The convergence of 
ASEAN norms with those held by China and India both legitimized and facilitated ASEAN’s 
engagement with Asian major powers. In contrast, alternative proposals for regional security 
cooperation by “outside entrepreneurs”, such as the proposal for a Asia Pacific Community in 2008 
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forwarded by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2007, failed to take off due to lack of support 
from either ASEAN itself or other Asian powers (Capie 2012).  
ASEAN’s engagement with external powers has been carried out since the late 1990s under the 
aegis of a US-dominated regional order built upon the 1952 San Francisco Treaty system (Sutter 
2009). Characterized as a “hub-and-spokes” network of bilateral security treaties between the US hub 
and its five regional spokes/allies – Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Australia – and 
underpinned by US military power and economic interests, that order is undergoing a paradigm shift 
with China’s rise. In the face of the region’s shifting power dynamics, ASEAN has continued to 
support the US-dominated security order – which has provided the political, strategic and economic 
conditions for ASEAN to evolve from a five- to ten-member body and subsequently to function as the 
driver of regional cooperation – while accommodating China’s rise. Faced with a security environment 
in transition, one in which the outcome of the interim order remains in question, ASEAN member 
states have, according to Goh, “functioned as willing allies and military partners, political 
‘middlemen,’ institutional brokers, and suppliers of legitimacy for a variety of major power decisions 
and positions: the United States to maintain its position; China to demonstrate good neighborliness and 
assurance through institutional and economic engagement; Japan to continue its important diplomatic 
and economic involvement in regional affairs” (2008: 156). However, the stability of the interim order 
remains in question because of uncertainties regarding ASEAN’s ability to manage security 
cooperation and America’s perceived diminishing capacity to preserve the existing regional 
equilibrium in the face of China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. 
Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea 
Contemporary South China Sea issues reflect the emergence of three key trends in shaping the 
regional interim order: America’s rebalance or pivot toward East Asia to preserve its preponderance of 
power, China’s rising power and force projection in the South China Sea, and ASEAN’s commitment 
to sustaining its central role in shaping the regional security landscape while at the same time steering 
clear of the growing strategic competition between China and the US. Security analysts see the 
maritime disputes as posing the “worst-case scenario” threat to peace and security in the ASEAN 
region and the “most serious challenge to ASEAN’s regional conflict management role” (Acharya 
2013: 7).  
Chinese maritime activities in the South China Sea date back more than a thousand years to the 
“tribute trade system” that was characterized by a network of trade flows between a hegemonic 
Middle Kingdom and its so-called “tributary states” in the period before the establishment of western 
colonial rule in Southeast Asia (Zhang 2009). From the earliest days, the South China Sea served as 
conduits for China’s tributary trade with Southeast Asia as well as South Asia, the Middle East and 
beyond. With the arrival of the Europeans powers in Southeast Asia beginning in the early 16
th
 
century, and as China’s maritime power declined in the late Ming period, the South China Sea was no 
longer a “Chinese lake”. Instead, it became a sea bounded by countries occupied by colonial powers 
(Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, French and American) and with its waters open to local, regional 
and international shipping. The South China Sea today constitutes one of the world’s major connecting 
bodies of water, serving as a key conduit of Asian and global trade. With more than half of the world’s 
sea-borne commerce and oil tanker shipments passing through its waters, the South China Sea is 
strategically and economically vital to ASEAN, its key trade partners and the international 
community.  
China’s peaceful rise and successful economic modernization over the past three decades have 
widely benefited its ASEAN neighbors and has contributed significantly to regional stability and 
prosperity. However, along with its meteoric economic rise and expanding military capacity China has 
also begun to assert its claim over most all of the body of water based on the “nine-dash line”, which 
was first drawn up in May 1947 by the Kuomintang government to delimit China’s maritime territory 
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(Till 2009: 38). Fully supportive of Beijing’s claims, most Chinese believe their country has a 
“historic, sacred and inviolable right” to all or part of the sea (McHale 2012: 2). That U-shape line 
reaches 1,500 kilometers south of Hainan Island and covers more than 80% of the South China Sea. 
Although China acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996, 
it continues to use the “nine-dash line” delimitation to assert its claim over its “historical” maritime 
domain, and its desire to control the fisheries, minerals and other maritime resources as well as the 
potentially vast oil and gas deposits to be found there. Articulating the official line, a Chinese analyst 
at a state-sponsored think tank stated: “UNCLOS, which came into force in 1994, cannot deny China’s 
‘U-shape line’ published almost half a century ago” (Cao 2014).  
China’s claims are challenged by four ASEAN states: Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, 
which are also signatories of UNCLOS. Claimant states seek jurisdiction over land features and 
exploitation rights over marine and seabed resources in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which 
extends up to 370 kilometers (220 nautical miles) from their respective coastlines. The treaty provides 
for adjudication of maritime boundary disputes based on competing claims pertaining to internal 
waters, territorial waters, maritime features such as islands, shoals and rocks within the EEZs and 
extended continental shelves claimed by the signatory states.
6
 When the Chinese government formally 
presented its nine-dash line claim to the UN in May 2009, it stated that: “China has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and their adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” (Cao 2014). 
China’s lack of clarity on whether it seeks to claim all of the waters of the South China Sea or only 
certain land features within the area,  with subsequent dependent maritime rights based on territorial 
waters, EEZs and continental shelf claims, is in itself a calculated policy of “intentional ambiguity” to 
maximize room and flexibility for future negotiations (Sun 2014). Beijing has also ensured that, 
through its declaration under Article 298 in 2006, it has no legal obligation to settle its claims through 
UNCLOS adjudication should a rival claimant resort to that mechanism to resolve competing claims.  
Of the four major island groups in the South China Sea (the Pratas, Paracels, Spratlys, and 
Scarborough Shoal), China and Taiwan lay claim to all four groups, Vietnam claims the Paracels and 
Spratlys, the Philippines claims many of the Spratlys and Scarborough Shaols, while Malaysia and 
Brunnei claim a few of the Spratlys. China’s willingness and capacity to back up its claims with 
military force was displayed as early as 1974 when gunboats from the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) attacked and seized the Paracels, then partially controlled by South Vietnam, and has held 
them ever since. After the reunification of Vietnam, China has clashed with Hanoi on several 
occasions. The most serious conflict occurred in 1988 when China dislodged Vietnamese troops from 
several reefs and atolls in the Spratlys. In 1995 and 1998, China launched naval attacks against the 
Philippines, successfully seizing control of the Mischief Reef (Ang 1999). Chinese belligerent 
behavior in this first phase of hostilities ceased in 2000 when it embarked on a “charm offensive” and 
“good neighbor policy” directed at strengthening relations with ASEAN (Kurlantzick 2007). 
Under its New Security Concept of 2002, Beijing sought “common security through beneficial 
cooperation” based on the principles of the UN Charter and its own “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence”, which called for the resolution of territorial conflicts through peaceful negotiation, and 
promotion of common prosperity, mutual benefit and common development (“China’s Position Paper 
on the New Security Concept”). The overarching objective of this foreign policy initiative was to 
maintain China’s political stability, broadly identified as “[first,] the stability of the CCP [Communist 
Chinese Party] leadership and of the socialist system; second, sovereign security, territorial integrity, 
and national unification; and third, China's sustainable economic and social development” (Wang 
2011). Beijing promoted economic and political ties with ASEAN by signing the China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2000 and being the first ASEAN dialogue partner to forge a Strategic 
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Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with ASEAN and to accede to the TAC in 2003. China’s 
“common security” initiative led to its accession to the ASEAN-sponsored Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in November 2002. That landmark document represented, for 
the first time, China’s agreement to taking a multilateral approach in addressing South China Sea-
related tensions in joint discussion with ASEAN to seek a peaceful resolution of competing claims. 
Under the non-binding DoC, ASEAN and China agreed to (1) affirm their respect for freedom of 
navigation and overflight above the South China Sea in accordance with universally recognized 
principles of international law, including UNCLOS; (2) resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes 
through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force; (3) refrain from inhabiting 
presently uninhibited islands, reefs and other features; (4) undertake cooperative activities that include 
safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation and combating 
transnational crime (ASEAN, “Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 2002”). 
China also agreed to shelve disputes and undertake joint development of energy resources in the South 
China Sea. 
China’s spectacular economic advances have provided the basis for its rapid military modernization 
and growing capacity to extend its naval reach beyond its so-called “first island chain”, an arc 
covering the Yellow Sea, East Sea and South China Sea, extending from the Kuril Islands, the 
Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo and the Malay Peninsula. 
Concomitantly, it is developing its “counter intervention capabilities”, termed by the Pentagon as an 
“anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) strategy. (Thayer 2013d: 7). Large increases in defence spending 
have enabled the Chinese navy to develop six lines of offensive/defensive capabilities: i.e., blockade, 
anti-sea lines of communication (SLOC), maritime-land attack, anti-ship, anti-protection of maritime 
transportation, and naval base defence (ibid: 6), all of which would inhibit the deployment of the US 
Seventh Fleet and related US military assets throughout the South China Sea and the East Sea where 
China is actively contesting Japan’s jurisdiction of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 
China’s economic rise, expanding political influence and military modernization in the region have 
led to an appreciable relative decline in US power. While Washington maintained its leading position 
when China was waging its charm offensive, symbolically important US non-actions such as the “no-
show” by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) annual meetings 
in 2005 and 2007 – due to Washington’s preoccupation with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – 
greatly disheartened the ASEAN hosts. Washington’s standing in the region, particularly among the 
Muslim populations, declined dramatically in the wake of its war against Islamist violence carried out 
following the al-Qaeda 9/11 attacks against the US in 2001. In short, China’s dramatic ascent in the 
region and its diplomatic courtship of ASEAN took place at the same time that America was perceived 
to have been inattentive and neglectful of ASEAN.  
America’s Rebalance to Asia and Enhanced Engagement with ASEAN 
The American rebalance or pivot to Asia signified both Washington’s intent to shore up and 
consolidate its strategic, political and economic standing in the face of expanding Chinese influence in 
the region as well as a recognition of the growing economic and strategic importance of ASEAN to 
American interests. Washington’s diplomatic, economic and strategic rebalance toward Asia 
comprises six key lines of action aimed at strengthening its bilateral security alliances; deepening 
relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral 
institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing 
democracy and human rights (Clinton 2011). Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs (2009 - 2013) and a leading architect of the pivot policy, explained that 
US foreign policy in Asia was recalibrated to meet the “new reality” of the Asia-Pacific, a region that 
generates nearly half of the world’s GDP and contains over half of the world’s population and which 
increasingly drives global economic growth (Campbell & Ely 2014). He elaborated: “Indeed, the US 
pivot to Asia has been accompanied by a pivot within Asia. Washington is balancing its historical 
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emphasis on the countries of Northeast Asia with new attention to countries, such as Indonesia, 
Philippines, and Vietnam, seeking to augment two-way trade and investment with some of the world’s 
most vibrant economies” (ibid: 110, italics added)7. In noting that the pivot sought to place greater 
emphasis on US security cooperation in Southeast Asia, Campbell stated that although US military 
bases in Northeast Asia remain central to Washington’s ability to project power and fight wars, “they 
are increasingly vulnerable to disabling missile attacks, and they lie relatively far from potential 
disasters and crisis in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean” (ibid: 110). 
Signalling the increased salience of ASEAN’s role in Washington’s Asia rebalance policy, 
Secretary of State Clinton described ASEAN as the “fulcrum of the region’s emerging regional 
architecture” and “indispensable on a host of political, economic and strategic matters” (Clinton 
2010). America acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009, joined in the 
ASEAN-sponsored East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2012, established a new Jakarta-based US mission to 
ASEAN, and created a new office of Multilateral Affairs in the State Department’s Bureau of East 
Asia and Pacific Affairs in 2011 to coordinate its policies with ASEAN and ASEAN-related 
institutions in which the US is a member, i.e., ARF, EAS and ADMM Plus. In deepening security 
cooperation with ASEAN, Washington has made the ADMM Plus the primary venue of engagement 
to pursue cooperation in five designated areas: maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, military medicine, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping (Harding 2013). US-ASEAN security 
relations were further boosted in 2014 when the US-ASEAN Defence Minister’s Forum was hosted by 
the US in Hawaii. It was the first ever meeting of its kind not hosted by an ASEAN country.  
Constrained by its burgeoning budget deficit, caused by two costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
well as the sharp and protracted economic downturn following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-
2009, the US has increasingly sought burden sharing by allies, friends and partners to help advance its 
global security objectives, including those embraced in the Obama Administration’s “pivot” to Asia. 
As the US has sought to reassert a commanding presence in the region at a time of increased concern 
about China’s capabilities and motivations, its re-engagement has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, 
not only by existing bilateral allies and partners but also ASEAN itself, which has helped shape the 
current regional security architecture in a manner congenial to US interests. Daniel Russel, who 
succeeded Kurt Campbell as the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs, 
described ASEAN as “driving real accomplishments”, whether negotiating jointly a code of conduct 
for claimants in the South China Sea, improving management of shared resources, or addressing 
transnational challenges (Russel 2014). By strengthening ASEAN and making the body a more 
important part of the international system of the 21
st
 century, it would continue to provide long terms 
benefits to the US. The high value the US places on its political, security and economic relations with 
ASEAN is a theme consistently stressed by President Barack Obama and his secretaries of state and 
defence during their frequent visits to the region to attend ASEAN-organized events in recent years.  
While expanding multilateral and bilateral cooperation with ASEAN and specific member 
countries, the US has also been mindful to simultaneously maintain a positive and constructive 
relationship with China. Aware that China regards America’s rebalance as a new form of containment 
policy to curb its rise, senior US officials have repeatedly assured Beijing that Washington’s pivot 
actively supports a role for China in regional and global economic and security institutions and 
welcomes a “prosperous and successful China that contributes to regional and global problem solving” 
(Hagel 2013). Washington continues to pursue deeper engagement with China at all levels primarily 
through the high-level biannual Strategic and Economic Dialogue in order to prevent a drift toward 
strategic rivalry and to reduce the risk of miscalculation that would undermine the bilateral 
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relationship. In 2013, China was invited for the first time to observe the US-Philippines Balikatan 
exercise and to participate in RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific), the world’s largest multilateral naval 
exercise (ibid.).  
Renewed Tensions in the South China Sea  
China’s charm offensive and good neighbour policy in South East Asia effectively ended in April 
2010 when Beijing reasserted its “indisputable claim” by declaring that the South China Sea was a 
“core interest” of China’s on a par with its claims to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang (Landler 2010). 
Chinese reassertion of its maritime claims is seen by some observers as a proactive response to the 
moves of other claimant states acting to solidify their claims vis-à-vis Beijing (Ji 2013). Malaysia and 
Vietnam’s joint submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 
2009, requesting information pertaining to their respective extended continental shelf claims, triggered 
off the current round of renewed tensions. Chinese analysts argue that the US pivot to Asia had 
emboldened ASEAN claimants to advance their claims at a time when political succession in China 
made it “impossible for the leadership to continue its passivity toward sovereignty issues” (ibid: 4). 
President Xi Jinping established and personally headed a central crisis response leadership group to 
coordinate the policies and actions of all government agencies, including the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy, to implement China’s new coercive diplomacy in the East and South China Sea.  
China’s assertive behaviour resulted in numerous though minor acts of aggression in the South 
China Sea, aimed principally at Vietnam and the Philippines. This maritime offensive has been 
characterized by policy analysts as “salami-slicing", a strategy of slow accumulation of small actions, 
“none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change” with the 
purpose of establishing China’s enduring presence in its claimed territory (Haddick 2012). Such 
actions included the harassment and arrests of Vietnamese fishermen; unilaterally declaring a fishing 
moratorium, such as the one imposed between 16 May and 1 August in 2013, in an area that covers 
Vietnamese waters. China has also confiscated foreign fishing vessels and cut off the cables of a 
Vietnamese state-owned Petro Vietnam vessel conducting seismic surveys within Vietnam’s EEZ. Its 
national oil company, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), has awarded offshore 
blocks for bidding by foreign oil exploration companies in EEZ waters claimed by Vietnam. In June 
2012, responding to Vietnam’s passage of its Maritime Law declaring sovereignty and jurisdiction 
over its claimed territories in the Paracels and Spratly Islands, Beijing established Sansha City on 
Woody Island in the Paracels, which it had seized from South Vietnam in 1974. Sansha now serves as 
the administrative center for China's expansive claims in the South China Sea. Beijing also deployed a 
garrison of PLAN combat ready troops to Sansha (Haddick 2012; Storey 2012). Other unsettling 
actions included the expulsion of Philippines vessels from the fishing waters of the Scarborough Shoal 
in 2011 and deployment of a deep-water oil exploration rig in waters claimed by Hanoi, an act that 
provoked anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam in May-June 2014 (BBC News, 15 May 2014). By contrast, the 
other two ASEAN claimant states, Malaysia and Brunei, located geographically further south from 
China, have been largely undisturbed by China but recent developments there point to the possibility 
of more assertive Chinese behaviour. In February 2014 China sent a three-ship PLAN flotilla to patrol 
the waters around James Shoal located within Malaysia’s EEZ. Although Malaysia’s response was low 
key and conciliatory (Reuters, 29 February 2014) a Malaysian analyst warned that such unprecedented 
Chinese military intrusions into Malaysia’s claimed EEZ were, in fact, the “prelude to the old Chinese 
game of ‘creeping assertiveness’ by testing Malaysia’s resolve” (Tang 2014). 
China’s strident reassertion of control over the South China Sea poses the most serious challenge to 
date to ASEAN member countries’ ability to maintain intra-ASEAN unity in the face of Chinese 
pressures on the non-claimant states, particularly Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar to take a pro-China 
stance. ASEAN’s inability to withstand Beijing’s divide and rule tactics was publicly exposed at the 
45
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) chaired by Cambodia in July 2012. At that time, Cambodia, 
deferring to China’s objections to including references proposed by Vietnam and the Philippines about 
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China’s behavior in the South China Sea, resulted in a standoff that prevented the release of a joint 
communiqué for the first time since the grouping’s formation (Thayer 2012). Concerned to restore 
ASEAN’s reputation and good standing after its debacle in Cambodia, Indonesia acted swiftly and 
decisively to reestablish a common ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Labeling ASEAN’s 
failure to reach agreement as “irresponsible” behavior, which put the grouping’s central role in the 
building of the regional security architecture at risk (cited in Storey 2012: 3), Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Marty Natalegawa conducted a 36-hour shuttle diplomacy mission to four other ASEAN 
capitals (Singapore, Hanoi, Manila and Phnom Penh) and succeeded in reviving an ASEAN consensus 
on China and the South China Sea. On 20 July 2012 ASEAN unveiled its Six-Point Principles on the 
South China Sea, signed by all members including Cambodia. The document reaffirmed and reiterated 
the principles of the non-binding 2002 Declaration of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea and called for an early conclusion of a binding Code of Conduct between ASEAN and 
China. ASEAN has maintained its consensus on the South China Sea since 2012. At the 24
th
 ASEAN 
Summit in Myanmar in May 2014, the Chairman’s statement voiced “serious concerns over on-going 
developments in the South China Sea” and urged all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint and to 
resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with universally recognized principles of 
international law, including UNCLOS (ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit). 
Washington first articulated its position on the growing tensions in the South China Sea at the ARF 
annual meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the US 
had a “national interest” in that body of water, and laid out the following principles guiding US policy: 
freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce; respect for international law; adherence to 
neutrality regarding conflicting sovereignty claims; recognition of maritime rights based on 
sovereignty over land features and delineated in conformity with UNCLOS; support for collaborative 
diplomatic process by all claimants in resolving their disputes; and active backing for negotiation of a 
Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China (Bader et al. 2014: 5) In February 2014, Assistant 
Secretary of State Daniel Russel stated that “the U.S. takes no position on competing claims to 
sovereignty over disputed land features in the East and South China Seas”. While asserting US 
“neutrality” on the issue of competing claims to sovereignty, Russel roundly criticized China for 
creating “uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region” and urged Beijing to demonstrate 
“respect for international law by clarifying or adjusting its claim to bring it into accordance with 
international law of the sea” (Russel 2014).  
While the US clearly opposes Chinese actions aimed at securing Beijing’s long term strategic 
objectives in the South China Sea, it also does not wish to take the side of a claimant state against 
China, since that would make the South China Sea a key divisive issue in the all-important US-China 
relationship. For example, while President Obama gave an “iron-clad” assurance to Manila that the US 
would defend the Philippines if the latter faced an armed attack, he left it unclear if disputed territories 
like Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef would be considered part of the island territories under 
Manila’s jurisdiction, and thus be covered by the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (ABC-
CBN News, 30 April 2014). On another occasion, when asked how the US would respond to China’s 
occupation of features within the EEZ claimed by the Philippines, US Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Jonathan Greenert equivocated: “We have an obligation [to help the Philippines] because we 
have a treaty. But, I don’t know in what capacity that help is” (cited in Tiezzi 2014). Such carefully 
modulated official articulations of US treaty obligation to Manila with regard to its South China Sea 
claims stand in sharp contrast to Washington’s citation of the US-Japan Security Treaty in expressing 
a clear commitment to protect Japan with respect to the latter’s territorial dispute with China over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  
Although Washington continues to maintain it takes no position on territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, it has strengthened political, economic and security cooperation with the ASEAN claimant 
states with new agreements, notably the US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership Agreement of 2013, 
and the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the US-Malaysia 
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Comprehensive Partnership, both signed during Obama’s visit to Manila and Kuala Lumpur in April 
2014. Beijing has predictably taken issue with US enhanced multilateral and bilateral security 
cooperation with ASEAN and ASEAN claimant states. It has insisted that the US has no legitimate 
role to play in a dispute that should be resolved only between Beijing and the ASEAN claimant states, 
as reflected in a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement: “China’s rights and interests in the 
South China Sea are formed in history and protected by international law. China stays committed to 
resolving maritime disputes with countries directly-concerned [sic] through negotiation and 
consultation” (“Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks” 2014). However, when 
faced with a reunified ASEAN and Washington’s backing for ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles, Beijing 
moved quickly to repair its standing with ASEAN by agreeing to commence discussions on a CoC and 
implement the 2001 DoC’s guidelines on China-ASEAN cooperation in the South China Sea (Thayer 
2013a). As a counterpoint to ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles, Beijing introduced China’s “Four New 
Points” to provide the parameters of Beijing’s participation in the CoC. These included: “reasonable 
expectations”, “consensus through negotiations”, “elimination of interference”, and “step-by-step 
approach” to a conclusion of the CoC (ibid: 5-6). China’s conditions pertaining to the CoC were a 
clear warning to ASEAN that Beijing would veto any measures it did not agree to and would not 
tolerate the “internationalization” of the negotiations through the involvement of the US and other 
outside powers. Moving to counter America’s Asia pivot, Beijing announced new initiatives aimed at 
strengthening China’s political and economic ties with individual ASEAN member states while 
“firmly [supporting] ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation” (Ma 2013). New cooperative 
initiatives include the China-ASEAN Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation and the China-
ASEAN Community of Common Destiny. At a high profile visit to Jakarta in October 2013, President 
Xi Jinping announced his “Maritime Silk Road” as part of China’s Grand Indo-Pacific Strategy, which 
seeks to bind surrounding regions more closely to China through a network of roads, railways, ports 
and pipelines (Shekhar 2014). That far-reaching initiative seeks to advance China’s geopolitical 
position in a “New Asian Order” by strengthening maritime and overland connectivity and promoting 
multilateral naval cooperation between China, ASEAN and India (Page 2014).  Emphasizing that 
“China has the capability and the will to provide more public goods to the Asia-Pacific and the whole 
world”, Xi announced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (with Beijing 
providing an initial $50 billion out of a total projected $100 billion capitalization), and China’s plans 
for an Asia-Pacific free trade deal (the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, FTAAP) at the 21-member 
APEC Summit that Beijing hosted on November 18, 2014 (Goodman & Ratner 2014). As part of its 
grand strategy for building a reconfigured Asian order, China has pledged to provide an additional $40 
billion Silk Road Fund. As envisaged by Xi, the locus of power of the new Asian Order in the 21
st
 
century will shift from Washington to Beijing. To reflect the new order, China seeks to recalibrate the 
rules and norms of the neoliberal international order that were set by the US, starting with those 
governing maritime security and disputed territories in the South China Sea. In contrast to America’s 
and ASEAN’s assertion that any territorial quarrels should be settled according to international law, 
and not by force or intimidation, China has declined to participate in UN-mediated arbitration.  
It remains to be seen if Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road initiative will be effective in advancing 
China’s political and strategic influence in Muslim-majority maritime Southeast Asia, an area where 
Chinese influence has historically lagged behind its political and economic standing in mainland 
Southeast Asia. So long as China continues to pursue its “salami-slicing” strategy in the South China 
Sea – most recently through attempts to enforce new requirements for all non-Chinese fishing vessels 
to apply for permission to fish in waters claimed by China, by moving an oil rig into Vietnam’s 
claimed EEZ in May 2014 and by building new structures on five reefs in Johnson South Reef in the 
Spratlys claimed by the Philippines, including an airfield (BBC News, 10 September 2014; Perlez 
2014) – it is questionable that Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road will find regional support any time soon.  
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Efficacy of the ASEAN Way and Security Cooperation in the South China Sea 
From 1976 when ASEAN ratified the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and established the ASEAN 
Way of security cooperation based on sovereignty, non-interference, peaceful resolution of conflict 
and consensus decision-making, ASEAN leaders have explicitly stated that they have no intention of 
forming a deeply institutionalized rules-based security alliance. Any proposal to transform the 
ASEAN security community into a NATO-style collective security pact is recognized by its leaders as 
highly unrealistic, given the fact that the ten disparate countries are divided by wide gaps in economic 
development, different political systems and divergent strategic outlooks. Lacking the capacity 
individually and collectively to assert themselves in any kind of military confrontation with China, 
ASEAN has to rely on its diplomatic and political skills, as well as support from the international 
community to protect its economic and strategic interests in the South China Sea. Lacking the 
necessary offensive power to deter China from unilaterally occupying territories and features in the 
South China Sea, ASEAN has adopted a strategy of “defensive realpolitick” and “proactive 
engagement”, the first by expanding security cooperation with the US, and the second by deepening 
economic and diplomatic engagement with China. 
ASEAN’s carefully handled defensive realpolitik and proactive engagement of China as well as 
other regional powers have to date proven successful. The “enmeshment” of major powers, 
particularly the US and China, in the network of ASEAN-led organizations has resulted in ASEAN’s 
central role in facilitating economic and security cooperation, and promoting regional integration. 
ASEAN’s leading role in the emerging regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific region has produced 
formal and informal processes that allow the US and China, each with their own complicated and 
sometimes contesting agendas, to constructively address major regional issues at the ARF, EAS, 
ADMM Plus and other ASEAN-hosted platforms. ASEAN’s instrumentality in facilitating America’s 
interests in the face of a rapidly rising China’s has led to unprecedented US endorsement for the 
grouping, as exemplified by Secretary of State John Kerry’s formal remarks at the US-ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in September 2014: “ASEAN and its centrality is essential to upholding the rules-
based system throughout the Asia Pacific, and it is the best way to ensure that all countries big and 
small have a voice as we work together to address the challenges and take advantage of the 
opportunities. That’s why the United States continues to invest so much in the relationship” (Kerry 
2014). 
Dealing with an assertive China in the South China Sea, ASEAN has essentially three policy 
options. The first is, as China clearly prefers, to interact with China on its own, while at the same time 
maintaining ASEAN solidarity and unity to prevent a repeat of the 2012 Cambodia debacle, and 
negotiate the best possible CoC outcome. The second, seen by most ASEAN leaders as probably the 
most promising, is to continue negotiating with China on the CoC but also rely on US political 
leverage and military muscle to deter Chinese aggressive behavior. The third is primarily to take the 
legal route and seek international arbitration under UNCLOS. This approach, endorsed by the US and 
many others in the international community, is articulated in ASEAN’s DoC as well as the proposed 
CoC. However, though to date all four claimant states have pursued the first and second option, only 
the Philippines has acted on the third approach. In January 2013, Manila submitted a Notification and 
Statement of Claims to UNCLOS to seek adjudication by the International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Seas (ITLOS) on four distinct claims: that the China nine-dash line is invalid; that China’s claims to 
the Scarborough Reef are not based on significant land features; that China’s structures on submerged 
features are illegal; and that Chinese harassment of Philippine nationals at sea is also illegal (Dutton 
2013). The Philippines’ legal action against China has predictably strained bilateral ties between the 
two countries, and Manila has been disappointed that no other ASEAN claimant state has joined it in 
seeking legal redress under international law. Faced with China’s refusal to take part in the UNCLOS 
proceedings or recognize judgments handed down in its absence, Malaysia, Brunei, and even Vietnam, 
have thus far not followed Manila’s example in seeking legal adjudication.  
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Given China’s persistence in asserting its claims through coercive diplomacy and refusal to submit 
to adjudication under UNCLOS, the South China Sea disputes are unlikely to be resolved in the 
foreseeable future. Thus, the US-backed Philippine “Triple Action Plan”, proposed in August 2014, 
which calls for a moratorium on unilateral activities in disputed EEZs, for timely completion of the 
CoC, and for disputes to be resolved under UNCLOS arbitration (Tweed 2014) is unlikely to see the 
light of day. Until or unless ASEAN succeeds in negotiating a binding CoC with China, the immediate 
task for all parties concerned is to establish cooperative mechanisms that will prevent incidents from 
escalating into armed conflict. In order to bolster its capability in developing effective risk reduction 
procedures, ASEAN would need to fashion a diplomatic strategy and work with the US, China, Japan 
and other EAS partners in strengthening maritime cooperation through increased military exchanges 
and training, expanded ship visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and enhanced coordination in 
anti-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief measures. Strengthened cooperation in such 
functional areas – preferably under the aegis of the ADMM Plus and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime 
Forum (established in 2012) – would create the “positive atmospherics” that would make the 
conclusion of CoC negotiations more likely to happen than not. For its part, by relying on civilian 
patrol vessels and coast guard (funded by the State Oceanic Administration and China Marine 
Surveillance Fleet) rather than PLA naval combat ships to enforce its will in disputed waters, China 
has thus far avoided “militarizing” the dispute, thus reducing the risk of a confrontation from spinning 
out of control (Rajagopalan & Torode 2014). Washington, for its part, should ratify UNCLOS. That 
move would greatly enhance US credibility as it continues to exhort China and other claimant states to 
resolve their differences on the basis of relevant international law (Bader et.al. 2014) 
Conclusion 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation establishes the principles, the non-binding mechanism 
and the informal processes for regional cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security 
issues. However, due to its emphasis on norms of sovereignty and non-interference, ASEAN remains 
at best a “nascent security community” with no common defence policy, no peacekeeping force and no 
vigorous conflict resolution mechanisms. At the same time, the grouping’s low key, informal and 
inclusive approach to multilateral security cooperation has brought in external major partners as key 
stakeholders in an overlapping network of ASEAN-led groupings, ranging from the 27-member 
ASEAN Regional Forum, with its expansive geographic footprint, to the regionally-based and more 
action-oriented 18-member East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and its 
own 10-member ASEAN Political and Security Community. Security cooperation within ASEAN and 
between ASEAN and its external partners is multilayered and multidimensional; all key players in the 
international community are represented in ARF while all major powers in the Asia-Pacific region are 
represented in the EAS and ADMM Plus.  
Despite the voluntary and loosely structured nature of security cooperation in ASEAN, that modus 
operandi has maintained intra-ASEAN peace and stability, beginning in1967 among the ASEAN-5 
founding members, then among the ASEAN-6 (when Brunei joined in 1984) and finally among the 
expanded ASEAN-10. In maintaining stability within the wider Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN is 
dependent on the major powers, particularly the US and China, to provide a peaceful neighborhood to 
promote economic development and unimpeded transnational flows of people, goods, investments and 
services. So long as ASEAN and its more powerful neighbors share a common interest in upholding 
regional peace and stability, South East Asia will continue to thrive as an economically dynamic 
region, where political liberalization and expansion of civil society are proceeding slowly but steadily; 
or sometimes with surprising speed, as has been seen in Myanmar since 2010.  
The efficacy of the ASEAN Way of security cooperation in the South China Sea is being tested at a 
time when the Asia Pacific is undergoing a historic power transition, one in which rapidly rising 
Chinese economic and political influence is eroding the United States’ long-held position as the 
unchallenged and sole superpower. The regional security order is in flux, and the stability of the 
Pek Koon Heng 
16 
interim hierarchy will be determined by how effectively ASEAN manages the uncertainties regarding 
Washington’s Asia rebalance commitments and Chinese expansionist intentions. ASEAN seeks to 
counterbalance China’s growing strategic influence by enhancing security cooperation with the US 
without simultaneously alienating Beijing to the point where a new Cold War could emerge, one in 
which ASEAN itself is divided between a pro-Washington and a pro-Beijing camp. The US-backed 
21
st
 century international order is a continuation of the status quo, which reflects a system of 
Westphalian neoliberal norms and international law that ensures, among other attributes, that the 
sovereignty of small states is protected from predatory actions by larger states and dispute resolution 
procedures allow for buy-in from all affected parties. The Chinese revisionist international order, on 
the other hand, envisages the restoration of China's historical hegemony, diminished US influence and 
less reliance on the letter of international law. Its unilateral expansionist claims in the South China Sea 
and articulation of a Maritime Silk Road under its Grand Indo-Pacific Strategy appear to be a prelude 
toward realizing such a new “Middle Kingdom” regional order.  
As China presses its South China Sea challenge to the claims of four ASEAN member states, as 
well as to broader international maritime interests, and as it seeks to reset the balance of naval power 
in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN’s role will be central in determining which vision of international 
order – Washington’s or Beijing’s – will prevail in East and Southeast Asia. To maximize its influence 
as a militarily weak but strategically crucial player in this scenario, it is vital that ASEAN maintains 
intra-ASEAN unity to serve as the only multilateral mechanism for security cooperation that is 
acceptable to all major powers in the region. In the final analysis, the efficacy of the ASEAN Way of 
security cooperation in the region depends on the ability of ASEAN to continue to function as the 
default security instrumentality and, thus, the key driving force of security cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific. So long as China and Japan are unable to provide cooperative leadership in establishing an 
alternative instrumentality for security cooperation, and so long as ASEAN itself remains cohesive, 
neutral and inclusive, the US, China and other regional powers will continue to support and utilize 
ASEAN as they – and ASEAN member states themselves – recalibrate and synchronize their 
respective bilateral-multilateral dynamics in response to the new security metrics produced by China’s 
rise.  
The “ASEAN Way” and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea 
17 
References 
ABS-CBS News. 2014. “DFA: Treaty ensures US will come to PH defense in disputed seas”, 30 April.  
Acharya, A. 2014. “Power Shift or Power Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security 
Order”, International Studies Quarterly, 58, pp. 158-173. 
Acharya, A. 2013. “ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security 
Community”, ADBI Working Paper Series #44, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 
October 2013. 
Acharya, A. 2009a. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order, Redwood City: Stanford University Press.  
Acharya, A. 2009b. “Indonesia: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power?”, Canada-Asia Viewpoints, 16 
October. 
Ang, C. G. 1999. “The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited”, IDSS Working Paper 4, Singapore: 
Institute of Defence and Diplomacy Studies, August.  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2014. “Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit”, 
11 May, available on: http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/chairman-s-
statement-of-the-24th-asean-summit-moving-forward-in-unity-to-a-peaceful-and-prosperous-
community [accessed on June 22, 2014]. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2012. “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China 
Sea”, 20 July, available on: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/aseans-six-point-principles-south-
china-sea/p28915 [accessed on 16 January 2014].  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2008. “The ASEAN Charter”, available on: 
http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf [accessed on 10 January 2014]. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2007. “ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter”, Media 
Release, 20 November, available on: http://www.asean.org/news/item/media-release-asean-leaders-
sign-asean-charter-singapore-20-november-2007 [assessed on 22 February 2014]. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2002. “Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea 2002”, available on: http://www.asean.org/asean/external-
relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea [accessed on 8 
January 2014]. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 1976. “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation”, available on: 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-
february-1976-3 [accessed on 8 January 2014]. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 1967. “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)”, 
available on: http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration [accessed 
on 15 January 2014]. 
Ba, A. 2012. “ASEAN centrality imperiled?: ASEAN institutionalism and the challenges of major 
power institutionalization”, Emmers, R. ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, 
London & New York: Routledge, pp. 122-137.  
Ba, A. 2009. (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Redwood City: Stanford University Press. 
Bader, J. et al. 2014. “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective”, The Foreign Policy Brief, 
Washington, DC: Brookings, August.  
Pek Koon Heng 
18 
Beckman, et al. 2013. Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the 
Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Busse, N. 1999. “Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security”, The Pacific Review, 12, (1), pp. 39-
60.  
BBC News. 2014. “Vietnam anti-China Protest: Factories Burnt”, 15 May. 
BBC News. 2014. “China says South China Sea land reclamation ‘justified’”, 10 September. 
Campbell, K & R. Ely. 2014. “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should Focus on Asia”, 
Foreign Affairs, 93 (3), May/June, pp. 106-116.  
Cao, Q. 2014. “A Sea of False Accusations: The Philippines’ legal challenge over South China Sea 
disputes is untenable”, China Institute of International Studies, 22 April, available on: 
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-04/22/content_6839866.htm [accessed on 10 June 2014].  
Capie, D. 2012. “Explaining ASEAN’s resilience: Institutions, path dependency, and Asia’s emerging 
architecture”, Emmers, R. ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, London & New 
York: Routledge, pp.168-179. 
“China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept”, available on: http://www.china-
un.org/eng/xw/t27742.htm [accessed on July 20, 2014].  
“Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on Comments by the US State 
Department Official on the South China Sea”, 8 February 2014, available on: 
http://brisbane.chineseconsulate.org/eng/fyrth/t1127014.htm [accessed on 16 June 2014]. 
Clinton, H. 2011. “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, 11 October.  
Clinton, H. 2010. “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”, 28 October, available on: 
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/clintons-speech-americas-engagement-asia-pacific-october-
2010/p23280 [accessed on 28 January 2014]. 
Dutton, P. 2013. “The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration and the South China 
Sea”, East and South China Seas Bulletin, Center for a New American Security, #10, 15 March.  
East-West Center, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & US-ASEAN Business Council. 2014. 
ASEAN Matters for America, America Matters for ASEAN, available on: 
 http://www.slideshare.net/andrewwilliamsjr/asean-matters-for-america-and-america-matters-to-
asean-2014 [accessed on 2 October 2014].  
Emmers, R. ed. 2012. ASEAN and Institutionalization of East Asia, London & New York: Routledge. 
Emmers, R. & S. S. Tan. 2012. “The ASEAN Regional Forum and preventive diplomacy: A review 
essay”, Emmers, R. ed. 2012. ASEAN and Institutionalization of East Asia, London & New York: 
Routledge, pp. 89-102. 
Emmerson, D. 2005. “Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN”, 
Japanese Journal of Political Science, 6, (2), pp.165-185.  
Goh, E. 2012. “Institutions and the great power bargain in East Asia: ASEAN’s limited ‘brokerage 
role’”, Emmers, R. ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, London & New York: 
Routledge, pp. 105-121. 
Goh, E. 2008. “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security 
Strategies”, International Security, 32 (3), pp.113-157. 
Goodman, M. & E. Ratner. 2014. “China Scores and What the United States Should Do Next”, 
Foreign Affairs, 23 November, available on: 
The “ASEAN Way” and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea 
19 
 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142384/matthew-goodman-and-ely-ratner/china-scores 
[accessed on 30 November 2014]. 
Haddick, R. 2012. “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea: China’s slow patient approach to 
dominating Asia,” Foreign Policy, 3 August.  
Hagel, C. 2013. “Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the IISS Asia Security Summit”, Shangri-La Hotel, 
Singapore, 1 June, available on: 
 http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5251 [accessed on 5 January 
2014].  
Harding, B. 2013. “Don’t Underestimate the ADMM+”, PacNet #65R, 19 August, available on: 
http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-65r-dont-underestimate-admm [accessed on February 2]. 
Heng, P.K. 2009. “A Constructivist Perspective of the Regional Order in Southeast Asia: Norms 
Transformation in ASEAN and the ASEAN Charter”, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, 13 
(2), October, pp. 1-32. 
Ho, B. 2012. ASEAN centrality in a rising Asia, RSIS Working Paper #249, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, 13 September.  
Huxley, T. 1995. Insecurity in the ASEAN Region, London: Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies.  
Ji, Y. 2013. “Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty 
Disputes in the South China Seas,” RSIS Policy Brief, Singapore, October. 
Jones, M.J. & M.L.R. Smith. 2006. ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional 
Delusion, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Kerry, J. 2014. “Remarks at US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, 26 September, available on: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/232229.htm [accessed on 28 September 2014].  
Kraft, H. 2012. “Driving East Asian regionalism: The reconstruction of ASEAN’s identity”, Emmers, 
R. ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, London & New York: Routledge, pp. 61-
73.  
Kurlantzick, J. 2007. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Landler, M. 2010. “Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands”, New York 
Times, 24 July. 
Leifer, M. 1999. “The ASEAN peace process: a category mistake”, Pacific Review, 12 (1), pp. 25-38.  
Ma, Z. 2013. “The Evolving Security Situation in Asia and the Role of China”, 3 December, available 
on: http://lv.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1105034.htm [accessed on June 11, 2014]. 
McHale, S. 2012. “Conflict Over the South China Sea: Identity Politics Meets History”, Policy 
Commentary, Washington DC: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, March.  
Nischalke, T. I. 2000. “Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-operation: The ‘ASEAN Way’, a 
Real Spirit or a Phantom”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22, (1) pp. 89-113.  
Page, J. 2014. “China Sees Itself as Center of New Asian Order”, Wall Street Journal, 9 November, 
available on: http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-trade-routes-center-it-on-geopolitical-map-
1415559290?mod=ST1 [accessed on 12 November 2014]. 
Rajagopalan M. & G. Torode. 2014. “China’s civilian fleet a potent force in Asia’s disputed seas”, 
Reuters, 5 March.  
Ravenhill, J. 2013. “Economics and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region”, The Pacific Review, 26 (1), 
pp. 1-15. 
Pek Koon Heng 
20 
Reuters. 2014. “Malaysia navy chief denies Chinese incursion”, 29 January 
Russel, D. 2014. “Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea”, Testimony before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, 5 February, available 
on: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm [accessed on 10 February 2014].  
Schofield, C. 2012. “Parting the Waves: Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction and the Division on Ocean 
Space”, Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 1 (1), April, pp. 40-58. 
Severino, R. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Shekhar, V. 2014. “Maritime Silk Route: China’s foothold in the Indian Ocean?”, Jakarta Post, 25 
February. 
Sheldon, S. 2014. “ASEAN and Southeast Asia”, Shambaugh D. & M. Yahuda, eds. International 
Relations of Asia, 2
nd
 edition, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 225-245. 
“Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok)” 2013. Inventory of 
International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, available on: http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/seanwfz.pdfcitation 
[accessed on July 10, 2014]. 
Storey, I. 2012. “China Pushes on the South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses”, China Brief, 12 
(5), 3 August. 
Storey, I. 2011. Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security, London: Routledge. 
Sun, Y. 2014. “China’s New Calculations in the South China Sea”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, # 267, 10 
June.  
Sutter, R. 2009. The United States in Asia, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Tang, S. M. 2014. “A Test of Friendship”, New Straits Times, 18 February. 
Thayer, C. 2013a. New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?, Washington DC: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 9 October. 
Thayer, C. 2013b. South China Sea in Regional Politics: Indonesia’s Efforts to Forge ASEAN Unity 
on a Code of Conduct, Paper presented to 3
rd
 Annual Conference on managing Tensions in the 
South China Sea, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, June 5-6. 
Thayer, C. 2013c. Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China, and the South China Sea, Paper 
presented at workshop, “The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st.
 
Century,” 
co-sponsored by Southeast Asia Forum, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford 
University and the China Program, Institute of Defence and Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies, November.  
Thayer, C. 2013d. Chinese Assertiveness and the U.S. Rebalancing: Confrontation in the South China 
Sea?, Paper presented to the Panel on the South China Sea: The New Crucible in U.S.-China 
Relations? Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, 22 March.  
Thayer, C. 2012. "ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-
Building?", The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10 (34), 4, 20 August. 
Tiezzi, S. 2014. “US Admiral: ‘We would help’ Philippines against China”, The Diplomat, 14 
February.  
Till, G. 2009. “The South China Sea Dispute: an international history”, Bateman S. & R. Emmers, 
eds., Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Toward a cooperative 
management regime, London & New York: Routledge.  
The “ASEAN Way” and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea 
21 
Tweed, D. 2014. “South China Sea Tensions Seen Dominating ASEAN Ministers Meeting”, 
Bloomberg Businessweek, 8 August.  
Wang, J. 2011. “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way”, Foreign 
Affairs, 90 (2), pp. 68-27.  
Zhang, F. 2009. “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical 
East Asian Politics”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 2, pp. 545-574. 
Pek Koon Heng 
22 
 
Author contacts: 
 
Pek Koon Heng 
School of International Service 
American University 
4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW 
Washington DC, 20016-8071 
U.S.A. 
Email: Pheng-b@american.edu 
